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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR RUSSIA’S
ROCKET ENGINES? ENFORCING THE
YUKOS AWARD
INTRODUCTION
n 2014, the former shareholders of Yukos Oil Company1
celebrated a major victory in their ongoing legal battle
against the Russian Federation. After nearly a decade of litiga-
tion, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) awarded Yukos
shareholders2 US $50 billion in compensation for Russia’s ex-
propriation3 of Yukos assets in violation of the Energy Charter
1. Yukos Oil Company was once the largest oil company in Russia, and
its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was Russia’s richest man. Terry Macalister,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: How the Yukos Tycoon Became Russia’s Richest Man,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/20/
mikhail-khodorkovsky-russia-richest-man. Before the company’s dissolution,
Yukos was producing over twenty percent of Russia’s total oil output more
than 1.7 million barrels per day. Biography of Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
KHODORKOVSKY.COM, https://www.khodorkovsky.com/biography/yukos-2/ (last
visited Nov. 11, 2018). For comparison, this is significantly more than the
output of the entire nation of Libya. Libya facts and figures, ORGANIZATION OF
THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, https://www.
opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/166.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
2. The former shareholders of Yukos Oil Company have, for the purposes
of pursuing legal action against the Russian Federation, organized them-
selves variously as Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus), Yukos Universal
Limited (Isle of Man) and Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus). See infra
note 4. These organizations have pursued separate actions against Russia
stemming from the same facts involving the dissolution of Yukos. Id. at ¶ 2.
For the purposes of this Note, the separate actions will be consolidated and
attributed to the former Yukos shareholders (“Yukos” or “the shareholders”)
except where procedural clarity requires otherwise. The Russian Federation
(or “Russia”) persistently refers to these individuals as “the oligarchs” in offi-
cial documentation. Id. at ¶ 84 n. 6.
3. In 2003, Yukos and its executives came under increasing scrutiny from
the Russian government. Bruce W. Bean, Yukos and Mikhail Khodorkovsky:
An Unfolding Drama, CORP. GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA 324, 349 (Daniel J.
McCarthy, Sheila M. Puffer & Stanislav V. Shekshnia, eds., 2010). After a
multibillion-dollar assessment of the company’s tax arrears, Yukos’ most val-
uable holdings were acquired through bankruptcy auction by Rosneft, an oil
company with close ties to the Russian government. Dmitri Gololobov, The
Yukos War: The Five Year Anniversary, SSRN ELECTRONIC LIBR. 1, 26 (Sept.
29, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275444. By
2008, Yukos had been dissolved, its assets all sold off, and its top executives
were either in prison or in exile. Id. CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested
for fraud and tax evasion, and Leonid Nezvlin, the third-ranking Yukos oli-
I
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Treaty (ECT).4 This was twenty times the size of the largest
arbitral award in history, with legal fees alone totaling US $60
million.5 Pending an appeal in the Hague,6 Yukos shareholders
now face the difficult task of enforcing the PCA judgement
against Russia. In order to collect their award, the sharehold-
ers must convince national courts to attach Russian assets lo-
cated within their jurisdictions.7 Most of these assets are
shielded from attachment by “sovereign immunity,” a doctrine
of international law8 that broadly protects states and their
garch, escaped prosecution by fleeing to Israel and has been convicted in ab-
sentia for orchestrating the assassination of several Yukos’ competitors. Id.
4. The PCA consolidated the three main Yukos claims into a single
award: Hulley Enters. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. The Russian Fed’n, PCA Case Reposi-
tory AA 226 (2014); Yukos Univ. Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Fed’n, PCA
Case Repository AA 227 (2014); Veteran Petrol. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. The Russian
Fed’n, PCA Case Repository AA 228 (2014). Yukos’ shareholders won their
case at the Hague on July 18, 2014. Jennifer Rankin, Russia Ordered to Pay
$50bn in Damages to Yukos Shareholders, GUARDIAN (Jul. 28, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/28/russia-order-pay-50bn-
yukos-shareholders-khodorkovsky-court.
5. The next largest arbitral award in history was US $1.7 billion. See Oc-
cidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Re-
public of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (Oct. 5, 2012).
6. In 2016, The Hague District Court quashed the award on the grounds
that Russia had never agreed to be bound by the arbitration provisions of the
ECT. Judge Stays Case Pending Appeal of Ruling Setting Aside Yukos
Awards, 31 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 10 (2016). This ruling is currently being
challenged by the shareholders at the Court of Appeal in the Hague. Id.
7. As Sebastian Okinczyc relates, “[h]arder to reach will be Russian fi-
nancial assets and assets of companies owned or controlled by the state, since
recovery will [only] be possible from instrumentalities of Russia and each
country will have its own view on what is and what is not an instrumentality
or alter ego of the state.” Sebastian Okinczyc, Yukos Arbitration - Past, Pre-
sent . . . Future?, SSRN ELECTRONIC LIBR. 1, 7 (Dec. 30, 2014), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543850. This process will most
likely necessitate a multi-pronged litigation approach because each national
court system will decide independently whether sovereign immunity applies
under domestic and international law. Id.
8. US courts have codified this doctrine in the Foreign Sovereign Immun-
ities Act (FSIA). See generally Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1602 1611 (2019). Nevertheless, the customary international law
standard for sovereign immunity is still applicable in US courts because, as
the US Supreme Court (“the Court”) stated in the The Paquete Habana,
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and [it] must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice . . . as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.” The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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property in foreign courts, with certain exceptions. Critically, if
Yukos can show that Russia is holding property abroad for
“commercial, non-governmental purposes,” that property would
not be protected by sovereign immunity and can be attached to
satisfy the shareholders’ arbitral award.9 For Yukos, however,
it may prove easier to claim their right than to enjoy their rem-
edy.
Pending the outcome of the investors’ appeal in the Hague,
Yukos may seek to enforce the 2014 PCA award against Rus-
sian space assets in the United States (US). These assets may
be especially attractive to Yukos investors because of their sig-
nificant value, commercial purpose, and clear connection to the
Russian government.10 Most satellites built for the US De-
partment of Defense are launched using the Atlas V rocket,
which is powered by twin RD-180 rocket engines manufactured
by NPO Energomash (“Energomash”), a Russian company.11
These engines are a rare example of a high-value, high-tech
Russian industrial export to the West, and despite challenges
from the US Congress and Treasury Department, it appears as
if these engines will not be subject to sanctions until the US
develops a suitable replacement.12 The Antares rocket is also
powered by engines built by Energomash,13 making two out of
9. This important exception will be explored in some detail and is ex-
pressed in similar terms under the FSIA and in customary international law.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 1611; see also United Nations Convention on the Ju-
risdictional Immunity of States and their Property, Dec. 2, 2004 (adopted
during the 65th plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolu-
tion A/59/38, but not in force) [hereinafter UN Convention].
10. Yukos has already targeted Russian space assets for enforcement in
France. Attempted Asset Seizures: France, INT’L CENTRE FOR LEGAL
PROTECTION, https://www.yukoscase.com/court-actions/attempted-asset-
seizures/france/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
11. The Atlas V rocket, produced by United Launch Alliance (ULA) a
joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin Co. is the only lift vehi-
cle qualified to launch many government satellites. Russian Engine Purchase
Adds to ULA’s Atlas 5 Inventory, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (Dec. 30, 2015),
https://spaceflightnow.com/2015/12/30/. It is powered by twin RD-180 en-
gines, which are purchased by ULA through intermediary RD Amross, a Mi-
ami-based joint venture between United Technologies Corp. and NPO Ener-
gomash of Khimki, Russia. Id.
12. Matthew Bodner, Energomash Raises Alarm Over US Ban On Russian
Rocket Engines, SPACENEWS (July 10, 2018), https://spacenews.com/ener-
gomash-raises-alarm-over-u-s-ban-on-russian-rocket-engines/.
13. The Antares rocket, built by Orbital ATK, recently transitioned to the
RD-181 engine, which is custom-built by Energomash and sold directly to
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three US launch providers dependent on Russian space tech-
nology for the foreseeable future.14 This Note will argue that
both international and domestic jurisprudence have made at-
tachment of foreign assets difficult, but possible, for a deter-
mined investor. In light of the close relationship between Ener-
gomash and the Russian government, Yukos has a strong
chance of attaching Russia’s rocket engines if it targets these
assets in the US.
Part I of this Note will describe the rise and fall of Yukos Oil
Company. It will discuss how Yukos became the largest oil
company in Russia and how the political circumstances sur-
rounding the dissolution of that company have affected the
unique progress of the Yukos cases. Part II will provide some
background to the current system of investor-state dispute set-
tlement and describe the status and significance of the Yukos
cases within that system. Part III will expand this analysis to
include foreign legislation and jurisprudence connected to the
Yukos cases, further considering the United Nations (UN) Arti-
cles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States. Part IV will
explore the rules of sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA), including connected caselaw. Fi-
nally, Part V will apply these rules to the specific circumstanc-
es of Russia’s space assets in the US and endeavor to identify
the most likely outcome of an attachment effort by Yukos.
I. THE YUKOS AFFAIR
Beginning in the early 1990s, the newly created Russian
Federation pursued a crash policy of economic privatization,
commonly referred to as “shock therapy,” in order to transition
to a market economy.15 Following the advice of Western econo-
Orbital. Peter V. de Selding, Orbital Sciences Expects RD-181 Delivery,
SPACENEWS (Jan. 26, 2015), https://spacenews.com/orbital-sciences-expects-
rd-181-delivery/. Prior to its merger with ATK, Orbital Sciences Corp. utilized
the unique AJ-26 engine, which in reality is a refurbished NK-33 engine, de-
veloped for the failed Soviet lunar program and hidden in storage until being
discovered by American engineers from Aerojet. Id.
14. Jeff Foust, Orbital ATK Looks to Antares To Handle Cargo Resupply
Missions, SPACENEWS (Nov. 10, 2017), https://spacenews.com/orbital-atk-
looks-to-antares-to-handle-cargo-resupply-missions/.
15. “Shokovaya terapiya” (translated literally as shock therapy) is a Rus-
sian term colloquially used to refer to the rapid privatization initiatives un-
dertaken by the Yeltsin-era ministers Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar,
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mists,16 the Russian government, which had previously re-
tained exclusive ownership of the nationalized industries of the
USSR, initiated a program of distributing “vouchers” repre-
senting shares of state enterprises to private individuals.17 Os-
tensibly, the goal of this program was to ensure a fair distribu-
tion of the wealth generated by the large Soviet industrial base
and increase market participation.18
In practice, the system enabled a relatively small number of
individuals, usually Soviet-era managers and powerful Com-
munist Party members, to acquire complete ownership of these
state industries for a negligible price.19 These individuals, who
would later gain infamy as Russia’s first “oligarchs,” were able
to manipulate the rules of privatization and acquire enormous
fortunes in a relatively short period of time.20 The oligarchs
especially from the years 1992-1996. MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, THE
PIRATIZATION OF RUSSIA: RUSSIAN REFORM GOES AWRY 11 (2003). Marshall
Goldman inquired, “why did Russian reformers choose a shock therapy strat-
egy and by extension a program of rapid privatization, a mistake that will
take years to correct? Why didn’t they move gradually?” Id.
16. Goldman relates further that “Gaidar and Chubais were also influ-
enced by the arguments, long associated with the University of Chicago, that
the de-politicization of enterprise ownership and its privatization results in
greater efficiency and is preferable to state ownership.” Id. at 67.
17. The “voucher privatization” scheme of 1992 generally marks the be-
ginning of this period, and it was terminated with the accession to the Presi-
dency of Vladimir Putin in the year 2000. Id.
18. Bean, supra note 3, at 327.
19. During this era, connections with the Communist Party, KGB, or state
industrial apparatus often translated into de facto ownership of certain state
assets. GOLDMAN, supra note 15, at 93. The managers of factories under
Communist power (referred to as “Red Directors” during the privatization
era) were frequently able to acquire the same factories they had previously
managed. Id. Goldman writes: “[s]ome also wondered why a former Deputy
Minister of the Petroleum Industry, such as Vagit Alekperov, or the former
Deputy Minister of the Gas Industry, Rem Vyakhirev, should end up owning
so much of what they formerly supervised.” Id.
20. Goldman reflects:
[T]his made [the oligarchs] very different from the robber
barons in the United States who built their empires by
building steel mills, railroads, and refineries. These Russian
oligarchs did not build. They simply purloined what previ-
ously belonged to the state and in the process became in-
stant millionaires, if not billionaires.
Id. at 117.
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used the comparatively large value of Russia’s extractive in-
dustries to leverage loans and amass capital abroad, while the
industries themselves either stagnated or their assets were
sold off piecemeal to foreign investors.21 By the mid 1990s,
Russia’s economy was in collapse, corruption was widespread,
and political power was largely in the hands of the oligarchs.22
In 1996, in response to a looming election defeat to the Com-
munist Party, President Yeltsin authorized a series of property
transfers in which controlling shares in the most valuable re-
maining government assets were supposed to be temporarily
given to private investors in exchange for emergency loans to
the government.23 In practice, the “loans for shares deal” con-
sisted of a series of rigged auctions where pro-Yeltsin oligarchs
were given permanent control over Russia’s most valuable in-
dustries, especially the oil and gas sector.24
Yukos Oil Company, along with Rosneft, Sibneft, Lukoil, and
other major Soviet oil producers, were among the only compa-
nies not divested by the government during “voucher privatiza-
tion.”25 Accounting for more than one-third of the world’s gas
21. Serguey Braguinsky, Postcommunist Oligarchs in Russia, 52 J.L. &
ECON. 307, 308 (2009).
22. This era was characterized by an “orgy of stealing.” Bean, supra note 3,
at 327.
23. The corrupt “bargain” struck between President Yeltsin and the future
oligarchs would return to haunt Yukos investors, as the succeeding Putin
government would eventually prosecute Yukos for its ill-gotten gains.
Braguinsky noted:
The complex loans-for-shares program finally put into place
called for the government to borrow hundreds of millions of
dollars in a handful of transactions from Russia’s new pri-
vate banks owned by the richest of a new generation of suc-
cessful young Russian businessmen. These oligarchs, having
become fabulously rich early in Russia’s transformation,
had a common interest in both preserving the Yeltsin gov-
ernment and seeing what else they could acquire.
Id. at 330.
24. Russia has consistently argued against the Yukos investors’ assertion
of an “international” identity, which was established through the creation of
various shell corporations dating from the “loans-for-shares” deal. Id. This
series of rigged auctions is also at the center of the Russian Government’s
claims of tax evasion and corruption. See id.
25. Id. at 329 30. The sale of these assets has been called “one of the most
shameful moments in post-communist Russia.” Id.
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reserves and a significant part of its oil, the Soviet petroleum
industry was considered the “crown jewel” of Russia’s economy,
with only minor shares being distributed to certain Kremlin
“insiders” during the first wave of privatization.26 Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, one of Russia’s first millionaires, was able to
acquire more than eighty percent of Yukos Oil Company
through the “loans for shares” auctions.27 Khodorkovsky, now
the CEO of Yukos, initiated a major reorganization of the com-
pany that brought partially-owned subsidiaries under Yukos
control, implemented a vertically organized management struc-
ture, and consolidated his personal control over the company
against Russian and other foreign investors.28 Russia’s tax code
during the 1990s was complex and even contradictory, hin-
dered further by corruption and a lack of transparency on the
part of government officials.29 During the first half-decade of its
existence, Yukos underwent several periods of ownership re-
structuring and relocation in order to avoid tax burdens.30
By 1999, Khodorkovsky had consolidated his ownership of
Yukos and earned a ruthless reputation for removing his oppo-
nents and becoming immensely wealthy in the process.31At that
time, dissatisfaction with the corruption of the Yeltsin admin-
istration was widespread, and the Russian economy was suffer-
26. Id. at 332.
27. Id. at 331.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 332.
30. One of Yukos chief financial officers, Arkady Zakharov, agreed to testi-
fy against his former bosses at Yukos during the PCA arbitration. Concerning
the real relationship between Bank Menatep and Yukos, he testified:
As a rule, the companies that we serviced for Bank Menatep
and ZAO Rosprom did not engage in active business opera-
tions nor employ any staff, but rather were used solely to
move, hold, and conceal the fact that Menatep Group had
interest in those assets. . . . Despite our status as directors
of these companies, however, all decisions regarding the ac-
quisition or sale of assets by the companies were made by
the principals of the Menatep Group.
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, UNCITRAL,
PCA Case No. AA 227, Declaration of Arkady Vitalyevich Zakharov (Oct. 20,
2015).
31. Bean, supra note 3, at 332.
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ing significantly after the Ruble devaluation and default of
1998.32
In May 2000, Putin called a meeting in the Kremlin with
Russia’s major oligarchs.33 The substance of the meeting was a
proposed deal: the oligarchs would not be prosecuted for the
crimes that allowed them to amass their fortunes, but, in ex-
change, they would be obligated to reinvest part of their wealth
in the Russian economy and stay out of politics.34 This accom-
modation appeared to be successful through the early 2000s;
nevertheless, Khodorkovsky’s increasing involvement in poli-
tics, as well as a purported plan to sell a controlling stake of
Yukos to Exxon Mobil, is thought to have prompted his arrest
in 2003.35 Following Khodorkovsky’s arrest, bailiffs seized most
32. PIOTR DUTKIEWICZ, MISSING IN TRANSLATION: RE-CONCEPTUALIZING
RUSSIA’S DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGES OF
TRANSFORMATION 14 (D. Trenin & P. Dutkiewicz eds., 2011).
33. In a 2014 interview with Time magazine, former Putin ally and cur-
rent London billionaire Sergey Pugachev related how himself and the other
oligarchs were invited to their first meeting with newly-elected President
Putin at the former dacha of dictator Joseph Stalin outside Moscow. Time
relayed:
Putin’s accession came as a surprise to Russia’s big businessmen, who were
nervous about the ex-KGB man’s intentions. Pugachev says he persuaded
Putin to meet them in summer 2000, a few months after his election. Putin
had been reluctant, but eventually agreed, provided he could specify the ven-
ue. “I only found out about it two hours before the meeting,” Pugachev re-
calls. “I rang up and asked, Where’s the meeting? In the Kremlin, or where?’
And he said: No, I’ve decided to do this informally.’ The meeting was at Sta-
lin’s dacha. That was very symbolic.”
Oliver Bullough, Former Aide Says Putin Has No Strategic Plans, TIME (Nov.
5, 2014), http://time.com/3547935/putin-pugachev-oligarchs/.
34. Thomas Land, Putin Pursues Russia’s Oil Oligarchs, 285 CONTEMP.
REV. 65, 70 71 (2004).
35. Leonid Nevzlin, former deputy head of Yukos, explained the Putin-
Khodorkovsky rift in terms of a personal dispute; his candid interview at the
Carnegie Center in 2005 shed some light on the otherwise mysterious falling-
out between Russia’s richest man and Russia’s most powerful man:
Putin initially approved the Yukos-Sibneft-ChevronTexaco
swap, which was projected to be the deal of the century.
Khodorkovsky was given the authority to act and informed
Putin on progress in monthly meetings. . . . In order to
speed up the deal and make it more lucrative, Khodorkov-
sky entered into talks with Exxon Mobil. . . . During a trip
to the U.S. in late September 2003, Putin was asked by the
CEO of Exxon Mobil, Lee Raymond, whether he knew that
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of Yukos’ assets in order to satisfy unpaid taxes, and these as-
sets were acquired by the Russian state-controlled oil company,
Rosneft, through a series of bids and transfers. Yukos Oil Com-
pany was dissolved in 2007, and Khodorkovsky remained in
prison until 2013, when he was released by presidential par-
don.36
II. INVESTOR-STATEDISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) AND THE
STATUS OF THE YUKOS CASES
Although Yukos investors won a critical battle in the Hague,
they face perhaps an even greater struggle ahead in trying to
collect their spoils.37 The unprecedented size of the PCA award
alone has raised eyebrows and serious issues concerning the
feasibility of enforcement.38 There are also political considera-
Exxon intended to acquire 51 percent of Yukos. Putin was
furious and accused Khodorkovsky of lying. Soon after
Khodorkovsky was arrested and the Kremlin alleged that it
was opposed to a Yukos-Chevron deal from the beginning.
Reportedly, German Gref told Putin that if the deal went
through only Bill Gates would remain richer than
Khodorkovsky; Putin replied that it was time to put
Khodorkovsky in jail.
Leonid Nevzlin, What does the Yukos Affair Mean for Russia?, CARNEGIE
MOSCOW CENTER (July 12, 2005), https://carnegieendowment.org/
2005/07/12/what-does-yukos-affair-mean-for-russia-event-796. Nevzlin fled to
Israel in 2007 after the collapse of Yukos and has been subsequently convict-
ed of tax evasion, bribery, and murder. Yukos Security Chief Gets 20 Years for
Murder, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2005), https://www.ft.com/content/c7a9ffba-
a107-11d9-95e5-00000e2511c8.
36. Shaun Walker, Mikhail Khodorkovsky Freed After Pardon From Vla-
dimir Putin, GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.theguardi-
an.com/world/2013/dec/20/mikhail-khodorkovsky-freed-putin-pardon-russia.
37. Group Menatep Ltd. (GML) Executive Timothy Osbourne, in a 2014
interview with Forbes magazine, stated: “It’s going to take a long while to
collect $50 billion but there are assets out there. I can see it taking another
ten years. We’ve stuck at this for ten years . . . and we’re not going to stop
now.” Andrew Cave, The Man Who Won $50B From Russian President Vla-




38. Yukos’ market capitalization in 2003 has been calculated at US $90
billion, and shareholders claimed before the PCA “no less than US $117.174
billion” in damages. Testimony of Mr. Tim Osborne, Hearing Before The Sub-
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tions that may ultimately block the enforcement of a meritori-
ous award.39 Finally, Russia has shown its willingness in the
past to pursue an aggressive strategy of litigation to protect its
assets abroad.40 Regardless of their eventual outcome, the Yu-
kos cases have already stretched the seams of ISDS jurispru-
dence, making some of the issues in the system stand out with
greater relief, and perhaps offering a glimpse of issues to
come.41
committee On Domestic And International Monetary Policy, Trade, And
Technology Of The Committee On Financial Services U.S. House Of Repre-
sentatives One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session 5 (Oct. 17, 2007). Of
this total, US $6 billion was owed to American investors. Id.; see also the “De-
struction of Yukos” page on his official website for CEO Mikhail Khodorkov-
sky’s calculation of damages to American investors, which is somewhat high-
er. Destruction of Yukos, KHODORKOVSKY.COM,
https://www.khodorkovsky.com/resources/destruction-of-yukos/ (last visited
Sept. 15, 2019).
39. Should Yukos succeed in the courts, it may still be defeated in the leg-
islature. For an overview of European legislative proceedings related to en-
forcement of the Yukos awards see Sebastiaan Barten & Marc Krestin, State
Immunity from Enforcement in The Netherlands: Will Creditors be Left Emp-
ty-Handed? WOLTERS-KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 25, 2017), http://arbi-
trationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/04/25/state-immunity-from-
enforcement-in-the-netherlands-will-creditors-be-left-empty-handed/.
40. Dmitri Gololobov, once Deputy General Counsel for Yukos, observed:
The long fight in NOGA and Sedelmayer persuaded the
Russian Federation to take proper care of legal protection of
its foreign assets. It is difficult to give an accurate assess-
ment of the assets belonging directly to Russia but their
overall worth is highly unlikely to exceed several billion dol-
lars. More than 95 percent of these assets are covered by
state immunity. Any attempts to arrest the rest, which may
be used for commercial purposes as was the case with the
property in Sweden arrested by Sedelmayer, may result in
prolonged legal battles in different jurisdictions with unpre-
dictable outcomes and high legal costs.
Dmitri Gololobov, The Prospect of Enforcement of Hague Arbitration Awards
Against State-Controlled Companies in the United States and the United
Kingdom, 3 RUSSIAN L. J. 7, 10 (2015).
41. Simon Bushell and James Davies have stated:
[i]t is clear that . . . the claimants would face significant
hurdles if they were to pursue the assets of Russia’s state-
owned enterprises. If they do, there is little doubt that Ros-
neft and Gazprom will be very well prepared. . . . In any
2019] Enforcing the “Yukos” Award 377
The importance of enforcement in investor-state arbitration
is not unique to Yukos, but Yukos provides a real-life reduction
ad absurdum scenario in which the limits of enforcement juris-
prudence have been tested and explored thoroughly. Arguably,
this thorough examination has not only clarified, but actually
modified, the doctrine of sovereign immunity in ISDS award
enforcement. Accordingly, before exploring the unique issues
raised or generated by the Yukos cases, it is necessary to first
examine the background and development of ISDS.
A. Development of ISDS
The network of multilateral and bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) underpinning modern ISDS was developed as a tool for
resolving investment disputes in the 1980s, and began a period
of rapid growth in the 1990s.42 During the Cold War, strong
ideologies of socialism and nationalism led to a period of ex-
pansion of state sovereignty, perhaps best embodied by the na-
tionalization of energy resources and extractive industries.43
The existing rules of immunity favored states over private in-
vestors and, accordingly, there were few cases brought by in-
vestors under this investment-unfriendly system.44 This state
of affairs changed dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Un-
event, it will provide an opportunity for further clarification
of this increasingly important area of law.
Simon Bushell & James Davies, Yukos Arbitration: The Difficulties of En-
forcement, UK PRAC. L. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreu-
ters.com/6-578-8425.
42. By the end of the 1960s, only sixty-five BITs had been concluded. An-
tonio R. Parra, ICSID and the Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will
ICSID be the Leading Arbitration Institution in the Early 21st Century?, 94
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (April 5-8, 2000). As of 2017, this figure had grown to
3,322 (including TIPs and similar multilateral agreements). U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2018: In-
vestment and New Industrial Policies, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2018 (2018).
43. George Kahale III, A Problem in Investor/State Arbitration, 6
TRANSNAT’LDISP. MGMT. 1, 2 (Mar. 2009).
44. Prior to 1990, there was only one known treaty-based ISDS case.
UNCTAD World Inv. Rep., supra note 42, at 92. Between 1990 and 2017,
there have been an additional 845 cases. Id.
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ion and the subsequent popularization of Washington Consen-
sus style market reforms.45
In both developing and industrialized nations, privatization
became the ready answer for any economic malaise, and the
potential for interstate investment grew accordingly.46 With the
growth of investment came the growth of protections for inves-
tors, as states signed on to investment treaties in order to at-
tract foreign direct investment.47 For states, this system had
the effect of providing investors with valuable risk insurance
against political change at the cost of significant disadvantages
during arbitration proceedings.48 As such, the system, although
45. The term is used here with reference to its popularly-associated con-
nection to neoliberal economic policies. See John Williamson, The Washington
Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development, INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Jan.
13, 2004), https://piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf.
46. George Kahale, one of the foremost ISDS arbitration lawyers in the
world, reflected that “[s]imply put, the prevailing view was that privatization
was good and state control over industry was bad . . . from a legal perspec-
tive, this ideology was fortified by an absolutist view of the principle of pacta
sunt servanda (sanctity of contracts).” Kahale III, A Problem in Inves-
tor/State Arbitration, supra note 43, at 3.
47. See Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudica-
tion: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 53 OSGOODEHALL
L. J. 211 (2012).
48. States have the distinct disadvantage of nearly always filling the role
of Respondent in ISDS cases, which impacts their preparedness and ability to
litigate in important ways at the outset of any case. Kahale III, A Problem in
Investor/State Arbitration, supra note 43, at 10. Firstly, states must hire
counsel, perform legal research, gather evidence, and create a litigation
strategy, all of which a claimant will presumably have had ample time to
arrange on their own schedule. Id. This problem is sensibly magnified by the
size of a given arbitration. Id. at 11. Secondly, states must meet the deadlines
established in the applicable arbitration rules for the selection of an arbitra-
tor: arguably the most important single decision a party can make in an arbi-
tration. Id. at 10. This deadline may be as near as thirty days after receipt of
an arbitration notice (e.g., the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or
UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules), or as com-
paratively distant as ninety days (e.g. International Centre for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules). International Chamber of Com-
merce, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 12 (2017), available at
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/ICC-2017-Arbitration-
and-2014-Mediation-Rules-english-version.pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]; Unit-
ed Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL],
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 9 (2014), available at https://www.un-
citral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf; Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Oth-
er States art. 38, opened for signature Mar.18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.1270, T.I.A.S.
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not created by investors, generally produces results favorable
to them49 and has often been criticized on this ground.50 Moreo-
ver, states are often ill-informed as to the potential exposure to
liability resulting from the signing of BITs.51 Making matters
even more complicated for states is the prevailing doctrine that
investors may structure their investments to take advantage of
treaty arrangements with third-party countries, such as the
Netherlands or Cyprus,52 even absent any meaningful connec-
tion with the signatory state.53 In recent years, a number of
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The main Yukos
case at the PCA was conducted according to the UNCITRAL rules.
49. Looking at the totality of decisions on the merits, about sixty percent of
all ISDS cases have been decided in favor of the investor and forty percent in
favor of the state. See UNCTAD, World Inv. Rep. 2018, supra note 42, at 95;
see also Howard Mann, ISDS: Who Wins More, Investors or States?, INV.
TREATY NEWS (June 2015); but see George Kahale III, Rethinking ISDS, 5
TRANSN’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 9 (2018) (“A study showing, for example, that states
win as many cases as they lose does not mean that the system is in perfect
balance . . . if most of the cases never should have seen the light of day. . . .”)
50. See Kahale III, Rethinking ISDS, supra note 49, at 5 n. 20, quoting
Vaughan Lowe, Book Review of “Commentaries on Selected Model Investment
Treaties,” 30 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 276 (2015) (“to criticize a BIT on
the ground that it only gives rights to investors is like criticizing a screwdriv-
er for only being useful for attaching screws.”)
51. As an illustration of this problem, the former Attorney General of Pa-
kistan admitted in an interview that his country signed BITs “without any
negotiation or consideration of the consequences,” and that most of the trea-
ties were signed because a dignitary was visiting a foreign country and the
two governments “couldn’t think of any other document to sign,” and that a
BIT “provides a good photo opportunity.” Id. at 1, quoting Alison Ross, For-
mer Pakistan AG Opens Up About Investment Treaties, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(Jan. 17, 2011).
52. The Yukos shareholders have taken full advantage of this tactic, struc-
turing their holdings through Gibraltar, Cyprus, and the Isle of Man. See
Hulley Enters., PCA Case Repository AA 226, at xiv, ¶ 1. The Russian gov-
ernment has challenged the investors’ assertion that they are, indeed, “for-
eign” investors for the purposes of the ECT, despite being citizens of Russia.
Id. ¶ 1294.
53. George Kahale reflected on the considerable capacity for abuse of in-
vestment treaties through restructuring, stating:
This is the investment law version of what tax lawyers used
to call the Dutch sandwich,’ referring to the practice of non-
Dutch investors taking advantage of the vast network of
Dutch tax treaties to structure investments in third coun-
tries through The Netherlands. With this mechanism, 2700
investment treaties are not really necessary, as one Dutch
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states have taken steps to either withdraw from or limit their
participation in multilateral investment treaties.54
These instances have not been limited to developing coun-
tries.55 The Yukos case has been litigated in a legal environ-
ment that may have recently passed the “crest” of investor-
friendly arbitration.56 For those states that have chosen to re-
main within the system, one response to the imbalance in ISDS
has been an increasing focus on the enforcement stage of arbi-
tration, in which states retain an advantage.57 This trend is
significant and should not be discounted as an important back-
ground influence on the progression of the investors’ enforce-
ment actions in the US and internationally.58
treaty with the host state could suffice to cover investors
from any country in the world. . . .
George Kahale III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?, 7 TRANSNAT’L DISP.
MGMT. 1, 10 (Oct. 2012).
54. Kahale notes of this recent trend:
In recent years, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Bolivia, Ec-
uador, and Venezuela have all taken steps to terminate in-
vestment treaties, some more radical than others, but all
the result of frustration with treaties that did not fulfill the
promise of increased foreign investment and seemed to
bring nothing but headache and the risk of catastrophic
awards.
Kahale III, Rethinking ISDS, supra note 49, at 3.
55. See, e.g., DAVID A. GANTZ, BAKER INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, THE UNITED
STATES-MEXICO-CANADA AGREEMENT: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE: REPORT (May
2, 2019), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/d14a5a86/bi-report-
050219-mex-usmca-3.pdf.
56. 2017 marked the lowest number of international investment agree-
ments (IIAs) concluded since 1983, and the very first year in which IIA ter-
minations exceeded newly concluded agreements. UNCTAD, World Inv. Rep.
2018, supra note 42, at 88.
57. See Ivan Philippov, Yukos Award – Beginning of a New Enforcement
Saga, CIS ARB. F. (Jun. 10, 2015), http://www.cisarbitra-
tion.com/2015/06/10/yukos-award-beginning-of-a-new-enforcement-saga/.
58. António Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN, stated in his introduc-
tion to the 2018 World Investment Report: “Global flows of foreign direct in-
vestment fell by 23 per cent in 2017.” UNCTAD, World Inv. Rep. 2018, supra
note 42, at 92. Cross-border investment in developed and transition econo-
mies dropped sharply, while growth was near zero in developing economies.
Id.
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B. Status of the Yukos Cases
In the wake of their 2014 award, Yukos proceeded to seek
discretionary enforcement of the PCA award in several Euro-
pean and American courts.59 These attempts to enforce the
award are ongoing, but have so far been unsuccessful.60 Share-
holders’ claims have been rebuffed in the United Kingdom (UK)
and France.61 After several negative rulings by the Brussels
Court of Appeal in February 2018, Yukos withdrew all at-
tempts to pursue enforcement against Russia in Belgium.62
Likewise, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that foreign assets
are protected by sovereign immunity, unless they are intended
for non-governmental purposes, and thus cannot be attached
for purposes of satisfaction or conservation.63 Yukos cases have
also been dismissed in Ireland and Sweden and stayed in the
US.64
Yukos shareholders have initiated several parallel actions
against the Russian Federation relating to the dissolution of
Yukos and the arrest of Yukos managers.65 These proceedings
59. For an updated catalogue of the various avenues through which Yukos
has diligently pursued compensation, see Attempted Asset Seizures, INT’L
CENTRE FOR LEGAL PROTECTION, https://www.yukoscase.com/court-
actions/attempted-asset-seizures/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
60. Russia recently announced that “[d]espite the Dutch court overturning
the $50bn awards, the Yukos oligarchs are still trying to enforce’ their claims
around the globe. Most have ground to a halt.” Id.
61. Id.
62. Yukos also desisted its efforts to attach Russian Government assets in
Belgium. Russia Says Yukos Will Not Pursue Brussels Enforcement Of
Awards, 32 MEALEY’S INT’LARB. REP. 10 (2017).
63. Sebastian Barten & Marc Krestin, State Immunity from Enforcement
in The Netherlands: Will Creditors be Left Empty-Handed?, WOLTERS-
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 25, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.
com/2017/04/25/state-immunity-from-enforcement-in-the-netherlands-will-
creditors-be-left-empty-handed/.
64. Through the International Centre for Legal Protection, the Russian
government stated that “[t]hese developments follow other setbacks in recent
weeks including the Yukos oligarchs’ withdrawal of their enforcement claims
in Germany and India, indefinite adjournment of the Yukos enforcement




65. Initially, there were three separate avenues through which sharehold-
ers sought redress: (1) in the European Court of Human Rights, related to the
arrest of Yukos managers; (2) through the ICC in Moscow, as Yukos Capital
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have taken place under various rules of investment arbitration,
S.A.R.L. against state oil company Rosneft; and (3) though proceedings at the
PCA in the Hague. Andrey Kotelnikov, Yukos Case: Background and the
Main Themes, Proceedings of the Energy Arbitration Conference, SSRN
ELECTRONIC LIBR. 1, 3 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2690245. The last of these actions is most commonly referred to as
the “Yukos case.” Id.; see also Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. OJSC Rosneft Oil
Company, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court,
in Y.B. COM. ARB. Volume XXXVI (Jan van den Berg ed.,2011). Yukos pursued
a parallel effort to collect additional monies from interest in England, result-
ing in a decision against Rosneft in 2014. Jonathan Kelly, Adam Grant
& Marina Zarubin, English Court Denies Application to Enforce Russian Ar-
bitral Award Set Aside by Russian Courts, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 9, 2017),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/10/09 /english-court-
denies-application-enforce-russian-arbitral-award-set-aside-russian-courts/.
In 2015, Rosneft announced that it had reached settlements with its remain-
ing investor-claimants without disclosing the condition for these settlements.
Rosneft Reaches Settlement With Yukos Investors, Ends Legal Disputes, 30
Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 13 (2015). It claimed that the settlement “will cease
all legal arguments pending in The Netherlands, England, Russia, the United
States and other jurisdictions.” Id. In Canada, a claim by Cyprus-based Lux-
tona Ltd. against the Russian Federation is currently suspended with respect
to consideration on the merits as the PCA-administered tribunal in Toronto
rules on a jurisdictional issue raised by Russia. Jerrod Hepburn, Inter-
im Award in Luxtona v. Russia Arbitration Comes to Light, Offering New
Reasoning on Provisional Application of Energy Charter Treaty And Russia’s
Attempted Denial of Benefits to this Yukos Shareholder, INV. ARB. REP. (Jan.
4, 2018). Yet another claim by Yukos Capital against the Russian Federation
is currently being litigated in the Swiss Supreme Federal Court, where in
2017 the tribunal most recently rejected a jurisdictional objection raised by
Russia, which contended that the state was not bound by provisional applica-
tion of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) since it had not ratified the instru-
ment. Jerrod Hepburn, Russia Turns To Canadian And Swiss Courts, Seek-
ing To Set Aside A Pair Of Yukos “Second-Wave” Energy Charter Rulings –
But Swiss Bid Is Deemed Premature, INV. ARB. REP. (Aug. 10, 2017), available
at https://www.iareporter.com/articles/russia-turns-to-canadian-and-swiss-
courts-seeking-to-set-aside-a-pair-of-yukos-second-wave-energy-charter-
rulings-but-swiss-bid-is-deemed-premature/. Finally, in June 2018, the Svea
Court of Appeal of Stockholm set aside an award to certain Spanish invest-
ment funds (Spanish Funds) arising from an alleged breach of the Spain
USSR BIT on the grounds that the awarding tribunal lacked jurisdiction in
accordance with the Swedish Arbitration Act. Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A.,
Orgor de Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000 SICAV S.A. and ALOS 34 S.L.
(Spanish Investment Funds) v. The Russian Federation, Hovrätt [HovR]
[Court of Appeal of Svea] 2018-06-07 9294-12 (Swed.). The preceding list of
claims does not include a considerably larger number of enforcement proceed-
ings that have been imitated by various Yukos entities in response to the
2014 decision of the PCA or awards in other jurisdictions. Id.
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including UN Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)66 and International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC)67 rules. The largest of these actions was an arbitration
initiated at the PCA in the Hague, in which the shareholders
claimed damages of “no less than US $114.174 billion” for vio-
lations of Russia’s obligations under the ECT.68 In 2009 the
PCA issued an interim award in favor of Yukos, and in 2014
reached a decision on the merits, awarding the shareholders
US $50 billion in damages.69 Yukos shareholders subsequently
initiated enforcement proceedings against Russia in the US,
66. UNCITRAL produces a “comprehensive set of procedural rules upon
which parties may agree for the conduct of arbitral proceedings arising out of
their commercial relationship and are widely used in ad hoc arbitrations as
well as administered arbitrations.” UN COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW [UNCITRAL], ARBITRATION RULES (2014), available at
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/contractualtexts/arbitration. The
primary Yukos proceedings in the Hague were conducted according to the
1976 version of the UNCITRAL rules. See Hulley Enters., PCA Case Reposi-
tory AA 226, ¶ 10.
67. The ICC, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, among others, all provide
modal arbitral rules which parties can agree to apply in the case of invest-
ment disputes. See ICC Rules, supra note 48; ICSID Rules, supra note 48;
SCC Rules supra note 48.
68. The PCA went to some length in the preamble to the 2014 Yukos
award, which gives an idea of the unprecedented scale, not only of the Yukos
awards, but of the arbitration itself. It began:
By any standard, and as will be seen, these have been
mammoth arbitrations. At the highest, Claimants are claim-
ing damages from Respondent of no less than US$ 114.174
billion.’ Since February 2005, the Tribunal has held five pro-
cedural hearings with the Parties and issued 18 procedural
orders. In the fall of 2008, the Tribunal held a ten-day hear-
ing on jurisdiction and admissibility in The Hague and, in
November 2009, issued three Interim Awards, each over 200
pages. . . . The written submissions of the Parties span more
than 4,000 pages and the transcripts of the hearings more
than 2,700 pages. Over 8,800 exhibits have been filed with
the Tribunal.
Hulley Enters. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. The Russian Fed’n, PCA Case Repository AA
226 (2014).
69. Id.
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UK, France, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and other
countries.70
1. Attachments Blocked in Europe
In France, Parisian courts blocked shareholders’ efforts to at-
tach the assets of RSCC Energia, a Russian rocket building
company, as well as Sputnik News Agency and Roscosmos, rul-
ing that the assets of legal entities separate from the Russian
government cannot be used to satisfy government debts.71 In
2016, the French government passed legislation significantly
expanding the scope of sovereign immunity as applied to state
assets abroad, applying an expansive interpretation of the pro-
tections provided by the UN Convention on the Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and their Property (the “UN Conven-
tion”).72 Previously, France was one of the few countries that
allowed interim measures of constraint against state property
without prior authorization from a judge.73 This legislation has
effectively barred creditors from attaching state assets without
an express waiver of immunity or consent from the state in
question.74 Belgium, too, has followed suit with a similar stat-
ute enhancing sovereign immunity.75
70. See the updated statuses of each case at the Russian Government site.
INT’LCENTRE FOR LEGAL PROTECTION, supra note 59.
71. Ben Knowles, The US$50 Billion Yukos Award Overturned – Enforce-




72. In its report explaining this Section to the Parliament, the French gov-
ernment pointed out that “more generally, relating to the assets of foreign
States, the conditions under which measures of constraints may be taken are
specified: as provided for in the 2004 Convention, the State must have ex-
pressly consented to application of such measures. . . .” Fleur Malet-Deraedt,
The New French Legislation on State Immunities from Enforcement, 36 ASA
BULL. 332, 344 (2018), available at www.kluwerlawonline.com/ASAB2018029.
73. Id. at 3.
74. There may also be a diplomatic dimension to this legislation, which is
explored by Malet-Deraedt’s article:
[In 2016] Russia enacted a new law on Jurisdictional Im-
munities of a Foreign State and Property of a Foreign State
. . . specifically, the Kremlin stated that ’[t]he law envisages
the possibility for a Russian Federation court to limit the ju-
risdictional immunity of a foreign State if it finds that the
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The press has dubbed these pieces of legislation “the Yukos
Laws,” for the apparently obvious connection they have with
enforcement efforts in the Yukos case. In a 2016 ruling in the
Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court held that foreign state
assets cannot be the subject of conservatory or executory at-
tachment without pre-authorization from the court.76 Further,
the court stated that, consistent with the UN Convention, the
sovereign immunity granted to state assets by Article 19 of the
UN Convention should be considered customary international
law and thus applicable in the courts of the Netherlands.77 At-
tachment efforts have been rejected for lack of jurisdiction in
Sweden and Ireland.78 Proceedings in the UK have been sus-
pended, and Yukos has voluntarily abandoned its efforts to
pursue assets in Germany.79
2. Award Overturned in the Hague
On April 20, 2016, the Hague District Court quashed the
2014 PCA award in its entirety on the grounds that Russia had
not agreed to be bound by the arbitration provision of the ETC
and the PCA thus lacked jurisdiction over the shareholders’
claims.80 The Yukos arbitration was initiated in the Hague and
litigated in accordance with PCA rules established by
UNCITRAL.81 Because the seat of arbitration is the Hague,
State in question offers the Russian Federation limited ju-
risdictional immunity’.
Id. at 332 (emphasis in original). Unsurprisingly, the new Russian law was
nicknamed in France the Retaliation Act.’ Id. at 333.
75. Russia Says Yukos Will Not Pursue Brussels Enforcement Of Awards,
32 MEALEY’S INT’LARB. REP. 10 (2017).
76. Gerard Meijer and Marike Paulsson, National Report for The Nether-
lands, in ICCA INT’L HANDBOOK ON COM. ARB., (Jan Paulsson & Lise Bosman
eds., Supp. 2018).
77. Barten & Krestin, supra note 63.
78. Irish Court Refuses Jurisdiction Over Enforcement Action Filed
By Yukos, 29 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 7 (2014); Swedish Court Finds Tribu-
nal Lacked Jurisdiction Over Yukos-Related Arbitration, 31 MEALEY’S INT’L
ARB. REP. 6 (2016).
79. See Gololobov, supra note 40, at 10.
80. This was the first time in twenty years that the Hague Court over-
turned an arbitral award, which was twenty times larger than the next larg-
est award in history, and would have amounted to twenty percent of the Rus-
sian Federation’s total annual budget. Knowles, supra note 71.
81. Hulley Enters., PCA Case Repository AA 226, ¶ 10, 13.
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member states can now refuse to enforce the 2014 PCA award
against the Russian Federation; however, the phrase “may be
refused” indicates that the standard is discretionary.82 Present-
ly, Yukos is continuing to seek enforcement of the PCA judge-
ment in France and the US, although the latter action has been
suspended pending the resolution of Yukos’ appeal at the
Hague Court of Appeals, which is projected to continue for up
to five years.83
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
The Yukos cases are not the first instances of foreign inves-
tors attempting to enforce arbitral awards against Russia’s as-
sets abroad. There were two highly publicized cases in the
1990s, in which aggrieved investors pursued Russian assets
with varying degrees of success. While US courts are not bound
by the foreign decisions connected with these cases, the paral-
lels to Yukos’ efforts are so extensive that they may have sig-
nificant persuasive value.
A. The Sedelmayer Case
In 1998, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) award-
ed US $2.35 million to a German citizen, Mr. Franz Sedelmay-
er, on the basis of alleged violations of the 1989 USSR-FRG
(Federal Republic of Germany) BIT.84 Sedelmayer had been an
early private investor in the Soviet Union, where his company
provided equipment and security services to the Leningrad po-
82. Article V(1)(e) of the 1958 New York Convention states:
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused,
at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only
if that party furnishes to the competent authority proof that
. . . the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, Sept. 30,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]
(emphasis added).
83. Judge Stays Case Pending Appeal of Ruling Setting Aside Yukos
Awards, 31 MEALEY’S INT’LARB. REP. 10 (2016).
84. Mr. Franz Sedelmayer v. The Russian Federation, SCC, Award, 118,
July 7, 1998.
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lice department.85 When his investments were lost through a
series of property transfers inside the Leningrad security appa-
ratus, he pursued compensation at the SCC,86 ultimately de-
fending his claim successfully through the Svea Court of Ap-
peals and up to Swedish Supreme Court.87 The initial arbitral
proceedings in Stockholm progressed quickly and concluded
favorably for Sedelmeyer,88 but the ease of obtaining his award
was compensated by the extreme difficulty of its enforcement.89
Following an extended saga of efforts to attach Russian gov-
ernment assets abroad, Sedelmayer was ultimately able to col-
lect around US $6.8 million from the sale of certain govern-
ment-owned properties in Cologne, Germany.90 This was the
85. Mr. Sedelmeyer entered into a joint venture with the Leningrad Inter-
nal Affairs Bureau, known as Kamenny Ostrov, purchasing real estate and
equipment for promotion of the business. Yarik Kryvoi, Chasing the Russian
Federation, CIS ARB. F. (July 13, 2011), http://www.cisarbitra-
tion.com/2011/07/13/chasing-the-russian-federation/. “In particular, he
worked with the Deputy-Mayor of Saint Petersburg Vladimir Putin who later
became Russian President. Mr. Sedelmayer built up, trained, equipped and
fully financed the FSB (formerly known as KGB) Counter Terrorist Team
GRAD’ for the 1994 Goodwill Games.” Id.
86. Sedelmayer, SCC, Award (1998).
87. Franz J. Sedelmayer v. The Russian Federation & Embassy of the
Russian Federation, Högsta Domstolen [HD] [Supreme Court] 2011-07-01 Ö
170-10 (Swed.), http://hogstadomstolen.old.domstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadom-
stolen/Avgoranden/2011/2011-07-01%20O%20170-10%20Beslut.pdf.
88. Damien Charlotin observed of the arbitral proceedings that “German
businessman Franz Sedelmayer’s claim against the Russian Federation was
a model of efficiency taking a mere two years to arbitrate, notwithstanding
a stark divergence of views among the tribunal.” Damien Charlotin, Looking
Back: German Investor, Franz Sedelmayer, Was Early-Adopter Of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, But Had To Engage In Decade-Long Assets Hunt Against




89. “While Sedelmayer was eventually able to track down enough assets to
satisfy at least most of his award, it took nearly twenty years and reportedly
140 execution suits.” Brandon Rice, States Behaving Badly: Sovereign Veil
Piercing in the Yukos Affair, SSRN ELECTRONIC LIBR. 1, 29 (Oct. 12, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2673335.
90. Accounting for interest compounding from the time of the award, this
amount was still somewhat less than the total awarded at the SCC. Char-
lotin, supra note 88. Sedelmayer’s victory also seems to have prompted a con-
siderable counterclaim alleging that Sedelmayer owes US $65 million to Rus-
sia in back taxes related to his defunct joint venture. Id.
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first, and so far only, case where a building currently used as a
trade mission by Russia was not considered immune from at-
tachment, making Sedelmayer arguably the most successful
litigant to date in pursuing Russia’s foreign assets.91
For the better part of twenty years, Sedelmayer diligently
pursued Russia’s assets abroad in almost every imaginable
form, including payments by Lufthansa for overflights of Rus-
sian territory, value-added tax refunds to the Russian embassy
in Germany, models of satellites belonging to Roscosmos during
the international aerospace show, and even a TU-204-300 jet
displayed at the 2006 International Space Exhibition.92 With
the exception of the aforementioned property in Cologne and a
parallel ongoing matter in Sweden,93 all of these efforts were
blocked by the application of either diplomatic or sovereign
immunity.94
The 2011 Swedish Supreme Court decision in Mr. Sedelmay-
er’s favor explored the extent of the application of sovereign
immunity to state assets in some detail. Asserting that the
principle of sovereign immunity over state property is an es-
sential consequence of the equality of states, the court looked to
the UN Convention as a codification of customary international
law. 95 Specifically, the court looked to Article 19 of the Conven-
tion96 for rules governing the post-judgement attachment of
91. The Russian Federation rented flats in the building to individuals and
companies that were not working for the trade mission. Kryvoi, supra note
85. The occupiers included ten Swedish nationals and two Swedish compa-
nies that had the mission’s address as their official business addresses. Id.
92. Id.
93. While initially Sedelmayer managed to get a decision in his favor in
the Swedish Supreme Court and started the auction proceedings for the sale
of a trade office in Stockholm, the process was later delayed by new court
cases, and at present, the building remains unsold, perhaps because of a
dearth of willing buyers. Charlotin, supra note 88.
94. Kryvoi, supra note 85.
95. The court stated that “[i]t has been viewed as a bigger intrusion in a
state’s sovereignty to subject its property to distraint than subjecting the
state to the jurisdiction of foreign courts.” Sedelmayer, Högsta Domstolen
2011-07-01 Ö 170-10, ¶ 9.
96. Article 19 of the Convention, entitled State Immunity From Post-
Judgment Measures Of Constraint, reads:
No post-judgment measures of constraint, such as attach-
ment, arrest or execution, against property of a State may
be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of
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state assets.97 The court focused on the interpretation of Article
19, sub-point (c) of the Convention as dispositive in determin-
ing whether foreign assets may be subject to an exception from
sovereign immunity.98 The court ultimately concluded that a
property that is owned by a state, but that is mainly used for
purposes that are unofficial in nature, is not protected from at-
tachment by sovereign immunity.99 Although US courts are not
constrained to follow the UN Convention, they are likely to be
influenced by its application in Sweden and elsewhere as a
matter of customary international law.100
another State unless and except to the extent that: [a state
has consented to this attachment, or] it has been estab-
lished that the property is specifically in use or intended for
use by the State for other than government non-commercial
purposes and is in the territory of the State of the forum,
provided that post-judgment measures of constraint may on-
ly be taken against property that has a connection with the
entity against which the proceeding was directed.
UN Convention, supra note 9, art. 19.
97. The court noted that the UN Convention was “largely but not entire-
ly a codification of customary law,” and that it should be incorporated into
Swedish law despite the fact that the Convention had not yet entered into
force at the time of the decision. Sedelmayer, Högsta Domstolen 2011-07-01 Ö
170-10, ¶ 12.
98. The court stated that “property . . . specifically in use or intended for
use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes.” Id. ¶
13
99. The court stated that, “[i]n the light of the above, it is clear that the
property . . . was not to a substantial part used for the official purposes of the
Russian Federation, [and] has not otherwise been of such specific nature as to
grant the property immunity from enforcement in the present enforcement
matter.” Id. ¶ 23.
100. The Report prepared for the Special Representative of the UN Secre-
tary General for business and human rights assessed the impact of the Con-
vention in its current form, stating that:
[s]tate immunity, being concerned with inter-State rela-
tions, is . . . a doctrine of public international law. Accord-
ingly, its ambit was and, for the time being at least, remains
a matter of customary international law. In other words, its
content is to be derived primarily from the custom and prac-
tice of States.
CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, STATE IMMUNITY AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY
GENERAL FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Dec. 2008),
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B. The NOGA Case
In early 1991, Swiss investor Nessim Gaon arranged a loan to
the Russian government through his company, NOGA, for the
importation of various agricultural products.101 After the fall of
the Soviet Union later that year, the newly-formed Russian
Federation ceased making oil shipments, which were expected
as repayment of the loan.102 NOGA subsequently prevailed in
an arbitration against the Russian Federation at the SCC and
initiated enforcement proceedings in the US, Switzerland, and
France.103
In 2000, NOGA persuaded French authorities to impound the
Sedov, the world’s largest sailing ship, as it lay in the harbor at
Brest.104 At the 2001 Paris Air Show, two Russian MiG and
Sukhoi fighter jets actually flew away to escape a similar sei-
zure by French police.105 In both instances, Paris courts held
that military assets were subject to sovereign immunity and
could not be seized without state consent.106 NOGA also suc-
cessfully attached bank accounts connected to Russia’s United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) mission in France, as well as the account of the
Russian Embassy.107 The Paris Court of Appeal lifted these at-
tachments on the grounds that they were protected by diplo-
matic immunity, even though the Russian government had
https://www.businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/bhr/files/Cliffo
rd-Chance-State-immunity-state-owned-enterprises-Dec-2008.PDF.
101. Russia Confident Noga Will Not Get Seized Assets, REUTERS (Jan. 23,
2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/noga-assets/russia-confident-noga-
will-not-get-seized-assets.
102. Compagnie Noga d’importation et d’exportation S.A. (Switzerland) v.
The Russian Federation, 361 F.3d 676, 679 (2nd Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 679. NOGA was initially awarded US $27 million. Id. at 680.
104. The ship had initially been captured from Germany in 1945 and used
as a training ship for the Russian Navy; it is currently owned by Murmansk
State Technical University. Seized Russian Ship Sets Sail, BBC (July 24,
2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/849455.stm.
105. Jon Henley, Russian Jets Flee Seizure in Paris, GUARDIAN (June 22,
2001), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2001/jun/23/5.
106. NOGA, 361 F.3d at 669.
107. See Embassy of the Russian Federation in France v. Permanent Dele-
gation of the Russian Federation at UNESCO, Commercial Bureau of the
Russian Federation in France v. Compagnie NOGA d’Importation et
d’Exportation, Cour d’Appel du Paris, civ., Aug. 10, 2000, in Y.B. COM. ARB.
Volume XXVI (Jan van den Berg ed., 2001),
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/document/ipn22917.
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previously waived its jurisdictional immunity.108 In Switzer-
land, NOGA succeeded in seizing Russian paintings insured at
more than US $1 billion, but only for a single day.109 The paint-
ings, on loan from the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts of
Moscow, included the works of Manet, Renoir, and Cézanne, on
exhibition in Martigny.110 The Federal Council of Switzerland
immediately reversed the grant of the lower courts, stating
that national cultural goods were considered public property
under international law and thus could not be confiscated.111
In the US, NOGA primarily pursued enforcement of its SCC
award in the Western District of Kentucky, chosen because of
the large grain shipments to Russia that pass through the ju-
risdiction along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers.112 Western
Kentucky is also home to the US Department of Energy’s high-
ly enriched uranium (HEU) processing facility, which is the
storage location for much of Russia’s enriched uranium stock-
pile.113 In 2000, NOGA filed a petition to seize the stockpile,
prompting Russia to suspend shipments of uranium to the
US.114 President Bill Clinton responded by blocking the at-
tachment by executive order.115 The remaining Kentucky sei-
108. Dmitri Davydenko, Russia Losing Battles but Winning Wars with For-
eign Investors: Cases Overview, CIS ARB. F. (June 22, 2016),
http://www.cisarbitration.com/2016/06/22/russia-losing-battles-but-winning-
wars-with-foreign-investors-cases-overview/.
109. Steven Lee Myers, Swiss Businessman Tries to Seize Art in a Dispute




111. Fédération de Russie v. Commision de Surveillances des Offices des
Poursuites et des Faillites du Canton de Genève, Federal Council of Swit-
zerland, case 7B.55/2006 (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.kluwerarbitra-
tion.com/document/ipn27200?q=%22NOGA%22 (available in French).
112. Philipp Bleek, Clinton Protects Russian ‘HEU Deal’ Assets, ARMS
CONTROL, https://www.armscontrol.org/print/705 (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
113. Under the terms of the 1993 US-Russia HEU Agreement, the US gov-
ernment committed to purchase five hundred metric tons of weapons-grade
uranium from Russia over a twenty year period. Id. This uranium, sourced
from dismantled Soviet nuclear weapons, is shipped to a processing facility in
Paducah, Kentucky, where it is processed for use in civil nuclear energy. Id.
To date, the US has committed more than US $12 billion toward converting
Russia’s weapons stockpile for peaceful uses. Id.
114. Id.
115. Exec. Order No. 13159, 3 C.F.R. 1429 (2000).
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zures were eventually consolidated with another action by
NOGA against Russian deposits in New York banks, which
NOGA appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit.116 Although the court did not explore the effect of sover-
eign immunity on the particular commercial activities in ques-
tion, it nevertheless affirmed the continuing applicability of
international standards to enforcement questions in US
courts.117 All of NOGA’s efforts to enforce its SCC award in the
US were ultimately rejected on appeal.118
IV. SCOPE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER THE FSIA
The FSIA119 determines when US courts may assert authori-
ty over foreign states and their property.120 The statute gives
116. NOGA, 361 F.3d at 678.
117. On appeal from Southern District of New York, the Second Circuit was
faced with the issue of whether the Russian government could be considered
a juridical entity distinct from the Russian Federation and, accordingly,
whether the Russian Federation could be held liable for the debts of the gov-
ernment. Id. at 677. The court considered the separate standards of federal
common law, Russian domestic law, and public international law, concluding
that under all three standards, a state and its government are not separate
entities. Id. at 683
118. Id.
119. In Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, the court commented that the
FSIA of 1976 was “[a] statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous inter-
pretative questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliber-
ately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a financial boon for
the private bar but a constant bane of the federal judiciary.” Gibbons v.
Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
120. The legislative history of the FSIA shows that the statute is intended
to preempt any other state and federal legislation concerning sovereign im-
munity, establishing a “sole and exclusive” standard in line with internation-
al norms. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 1398 at 1402 (1976). The Supreme Court
has confirmed this interpretation, stating that “immunity is granted in those
cases involving violations of international law that do not come within one of
the FSIA’s exceptions.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
The legislative report is replete with references to international law stand-
ards, and it makes clear that the FSIA was formulated to depoliticize deter-
minations of state immunity by removing the question from the State De-
partment, which had previously made such decisions, and placing them ex-
clusively before the courts. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 (1976). For a more de-
tailed description of the evolution of sovereign immunity in US law, see San-
dra Engle, Choosing Law for Attributing Liability under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act: A Proposal for Uniformity, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1060,
1070 (1991).
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states total immunity from suit and prohibits any attachment
or arrest of state property, subject only to certain exceptions.121
Claimants seeking to enforce an arbitration award in the US
have the burden of demonstrating that the debtor state is not
jurisdictionally immune and that its assets are not immune
from seizure.122 As a signatory to the UN Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(“New York Convention”), the US is required under interna-
tional law to recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in US courts.123 Therefore, if Yukos pursues enforcement
of its PCA award in the US, its main challenge will be to show
that Russia’s assets are not subject to immunity from execu-
tion.124
A. Exceptions to the Immunity from Attachment or Execution
Section 1610 of the FSIA enumerates the exceptions under
which a foreign state’s property may be subject to attachment
in US courts.125 The most pertinent exception for arbitration
creditors is § 1610(a)(6), which reads:
The property in the United States of a foreign state . . .
shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execu-
tion, or from execution upon a judgement, [if] . . . (6) the
121. Sections 1604 05 of the statute govern immunity from jurisdiction,
while sections 1609 10 govern immunity from attachment. Both sections are
structured such as to provide total protection, by default, to foreign states,
and then enumerate specific exceptions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604 05.
122. Molly Steele & Michael Heinlen, Challenges to Enforcing Arbitral
Awards Against Foreign States in the United States, 42 INT’L LAW. 87, 88
(2008).
123. Since acceding to the New York Convention in 1970, US courts have
consistently recognized and domesticated foreign arbitral awards. See Joseph
T. McLaughlin & Laurie Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the
New York Convention - Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 249,
249 (1986). Article V of the New York Convention provides only seven
grounds for refusing recognition of an award, such as improper notice or
composition of the original arbitral tribunal, and the burden of proof is on the
party wishing to block recognition. Id. The Convention has been incorporated
into US domestic law through the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 9 U.S.C. §§
201 208 (1925); New York Convention, supra note 82.
124. Even if the set-aside of the PCA award at the Hague is confirmed, US
courts may still recognize Yukos’ award, as the set-aside exception in the
New York Convention is discretionary. See Knowles, supra note 71.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
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judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral
award rendered against the foreign state. . . .”126
This provision has received little attention from US courts or
legislators,127 but caselaw suggests that the holder of an arbi-
tral award has no additional burden to show the applicability
of § 1610(a)(6) beyond producing the award itself.128 This bur-
den is identical to that imposed by the New York Conven-
tion,129 which is considered a low barrier for claimants.130
B. Agency or Instrumentality of a Foreign State
The FSIA grants immunity from enforcement not only to
states, but to the “political subdivisions, agencies or instrumen-
talities” of states.131 The exceptions provided to this immunity
are also applied to these agencies or instrumentalities; in this
126. Id.
127. There is no discussion of this provision in the legislative report on the
FSIA. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 1398 (1976).
128. In Libancell S.A.L. v. Republic of Lebanon, the court wrote that a pri-
vate creditor would be entitled to post-judgement recognition of an arbitral
award against Lebanon under § 1610(a)(6) without any additional conditions.
Attachment was not granted because the complainant had applied pre-
judgement. Libancell S.A.L. v. Republic of Lebanon, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29442
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). In Suraleb, Inc. v. Prod. Ass’n “Minsk Tractor Works,” a debt
collector was allowed to domesticate its arbitration award against Belarus
under § 1610(a)(6). Suraleb, Inc. v. Prod. Ass’n “Minsk Tractor Works,” 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7354 at 5 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The court stated simply that,
“[b]ecause this judgment was based on an order confirming an arbitral award
and concerns property used for commercial activity in the United States, the
judgment falls within the § 1610(a) exception.” Id. This was the entirety of its
analysis. Id. In Solgas Energy Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, the court held
that the property of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) could be at-
tached by a garnishee “based on the order confirming the international arbi-
tral award” from a lower court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6). Solgas Energy
Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72326 1, 6 (S.D. Tex.
2010). Finally, in Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
the court recognized that assets belonging to Petróleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), a Venezuelan petroleum company, could be attached by a com-
plainant because Venezuela did not dispute the existence of a valid arbitra-
tion award against it. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, 333 F. Supp. 3d 380, 416 (D. Del. 2018).
129. Article IV requires only that a party applying for recognition of an ar-
bitral award should provide an authenticated copy of the award, along with a
translation if necessary. New York Convention, supra note 82, art. IV.
130. McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 123, at 249.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
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way, a state cannot prevent enforcement of awards against it
by simply cloaking its activities in a corporate or other ostensi-
bly non-governmental form.132 In order to seize the assets of a
foreign company to satisfy an arbitral award against a state, a
complainant must first demonstrate that the company qualifies
as an agency or instrumentality of that state under § 1603 of
the FSIA.133 This showing has two main requirements: (1) that
the company is a separate legal person, and (2) that the state
holds the majority of ownership interests in the company.134
The first criterion is fulfilled by showing that the company
can sue or be sued in its own name, as well as enter into con-
tracts and hold property.135 To distinguish the agents and in-
strumentalities of the state from organs of the state, which
might also have a corporate form, US courts have considered
whether the activity of foreign companies is primarily govern-
mental or commercial.136 When foreign entities are given a cor-
porate form, courts have accorded them a strong presumption
132. As the Supreme Court stated in its seminal decision on sovereign im-
munity for foreign corporations: “The corporate form will not be blindly ad-
hered to where doing so would cause an injustice. . . . To hold otherwise
would permit governments to avoid the requirements of international law
simply by creating juridical entities whenever the need arises.” First Nat’l
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 611
(1983) [hereinafter Bancec]. The Court held that the national bank of Cuba
could not avail itself of sovereign immunity as an organ of a foreign state,
while simultaneously insulating the Cuban government from liability
through its separate legal status. Id. The Court also explored the important
determination of whether an agent or instrumentality can be considered the
“alter ego” of the state for liability purposes, which is a complex substantive
topic not discussed in this Note. Id.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
135. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 1406 (1976).
136. In Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, the court explored the
difference between an organ of the state, which is treated as the state itself,
and an agency or instrumentality. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boli-
viana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 53 (D.C. Cir. 1994). It confirmed that the categorical
approach, which looks to commercial versus government activity, was the
best expression of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “restrictive theo-
ry” codified in the FSIA. Id. at 151. Under this approach, the court held that
the Bolivian Air Force was an organ of the state, not an agency or instrumen-
tality. State organs have been accorded greater protection than separate
state-controlled entities. Id. at 154.
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of separate status,137 such that most state-owned enterprises
will fulfill the “separate legal person” requirement.138
The second criterion is fulfilled by showing that the majority
of shares of a company are owned by a foreign state.139 This
ownership may be either by the state itself, or through some
political subdivision of the state.140 In Dole Food Co. v. Patrick-
son, the Supreme Court held that only the government’s direct
ownership of shares, rather than ownership through a majority
holding in one or several parent companies, is the correct test
for majority ownership.141 While there are circumstances where
courts may elect to bypass the Dole test,142 they are generally
reluctant to do so except where there is strong evidence that
the corporate form is being deliberately manipulated to shield a
state from liability.143 The second criterion may also be met by
demonstrating that a company is in fact an organ of the state,
but this designation has only been applied to companies which
have primarily governmental, rather than commercial func-
tions.144 The definition of a “political subdivision” has likewise
been interpreted by the courts to encompass government min-
137. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627.
138. Clifford Chance LLP, supra note 100, at 5.
139. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 1406 (1976).
140. The legislative report provides some examples, stating that a number
of different organizational forms might be recognized as agents or instrumen-
talities for the purposes of the statute, including “a state trading corporation,
a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a shipping line or air-
line, a steel company, a central bank, an export association, a governmental
procurement agency, or a department or ministry which acts and is suable in
its own name.” Id. at 1406.
141. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
142. The Dole court characterized these instances as a “rare exception” to
the general rule applied in Bancec that foreign entities established inde-
pendently from the government are presumed to be separate. Id. at 475.
143. In Dole, the Court applied the presumption of separateness to the
Dead Sea Companies, which were owned by a series of subsidiary companies,
the parent of which was majority owned by Israel. Id. The court held that,
because the language of § 1603(a) uses “ownership” without including any
qualifiers about “direct or indirect ownership,” the purpose of the FSIA was
only to grant agency status to entities directly owned by foreign governments,
not their subsidiaries. Id.
144. See, e.g., EOTT Energy Operating Ltd. P’Ship v. Winterthur Swiss Ins.
Co., 257 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (where the Ninth Circuit remanded a
lower court determination that an Irish state insurance company was not an
“organ” of the state of Ireland because of the commercial nature of its activi-
ties).
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istries and agencies,145 and the legislative history states that it
“includes all governmental units beneath the central govern-
ment.”146 Therefore, if a successful arbitration creditor can
demonstrate majority ownership of a foreign company’s shares
by a state or its subdivisions, that company will most likely be
subject to the FSIA and fall under the § 1610(a)(6) sovereign
immunity exception.147
V. ANALYSIS
If Yukos moves to attach Russia’s space assets, US courts will
look to the FSIA to determine whether to accord these assets
sovereign immunity.148 However, as the court recalled in
Bancec, “[t]he expropriation claim . . . arises under interna-
tional law, which, as we have frequently stated, is part of our
law. . . .’”149 Further, the legislative history specifically states
that the FSIA was drafted “to bring US practice into conformity
with that of most other nations.”150 Accordingly, courts may
take into account both domestic and international jurispru-
dence when determining whether to accord sovereign immunity
to Russia’s space assets.
There is little question that Yukos will be able to assert an
exception to § 1609 of the FSIA because it is currently in pos-
145. See O’Connell Machinery Co. v. M.V. “Americana,” in which the court
held that a maritime holding company under direct control of an Italian pub-
lic financial entity was a political subdivision of Italy, despite the fact that
the Italian government had chosen to “double tier” its administrative agen-
cies by making one subsidiary to another. O’Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V.
“Americana,” 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984). While the Supreme Court in Dole
would later reject “tiering” ownership for the purposes of determining agency
or instrumentality status, it never reached the issue of whether subsidiary
ownership affects the status of political subdivisions. Id. See also Chettri v.
Nepal Bangl. Bank, Ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122731 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (in
which the court held that Nepal’s Department of Revenue investigation was a
political subdivision of the Nepalese government, despite its status as a sub-
department in the Department of Finance).
146. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 1406 (1976).
147. Gololobov, supra note 40, at 22.
148. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 1398, at 1404 (1976).
149. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 623. The court further stated that, “the principles
governing this claim are common to both international law and federal com-
mon law.” Id.
150. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 1398 (1976). The report concluded that “[i]n
virtually every country, the United States has found that sovereign immunity
is a question of international law to be decided by the courts.” Id.
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session of a bona fide arbitral award against Russia.151 US
courts are bound by the New York Convention to recognize this
award and may recognize it even if the award is ultimately
overturned in the Hague.152 This jurisdictional exception is also
mirrored in Article 17 of the UN Convention.153 United Launch
Alliance (ULA) and Orbital ATK purchase the RD-180/181 en-
gines for commercial satellite launches, which fulfils the “com-
mercial activity” qualifier in both provisions.154 Additionally,
Yukos should have little difficulty showing that Energomash is
a separate legal entity, as required by FSIA § 1603(b)(2), be-
cause Energomash is a corporation that follows the formalities
of corporate structure and governance.155 Despite the “re-
nationalization” of Russia’s space sector, Energomash retains
an independent board of directors and manages its own busi-
ness with surprisingly little government oversight.156
Yukos will have more difficulty demonstrating that Ener-
gomash is an “agency or instrumentality” of the Russian gov-
ernment. Both the UN Convention and the FSIA provide excep-
151. In line with the court’s decisions in Libancell, Suraleb, and Crystallex,
any inquiry into the legitimacy of the arbitration should be very minimal,
and the courts are not likely to challenge the validity of the PCA.
152. New York Convention, supra note 82.
153. The provision reads: “If a State enters into an agreement in writing
with a foreign natural or juridical person to submit to arbitration differences
relating to a commercial transaction, that State cannot invoke immunity
from jurisdiction before a court of another State. . . .” UN Convention, supra
note 9, art. 17.
154. ULA also uses the RD-180 on Atlas launches of National Reconnais-
sance Office (NRO) spy satellites, but it accounts separately for engines used
in military and non-military launches. Bodner, supra note 12. Both the FSIA
and UN Convention grant complete immunity to military assets. New York
Convention, supra note 82.
155. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 627.
156. Formed in 1931 as an independent design bureau (the corporate form
did not exist in the Soviet Union), Energomash operated separately from the
other design bureaus. See NPO Energomash, https://en-
gine.space/eng/about/history (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). Energomash pro-
duced the engines used to launch the first artificial satellite (Sputnik), as
well as those that carried the first man into space in 1961. Id. The company
has maintained its independent governance and structure despite the acqui-
sition of the entirety of its shares by the government-owned Unified Rocket
and Space Corporation (ORKK) in 2015. NPO Energomash,
https://engine.space/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). Details about Ener-
gomash’s corporate structure and history are available on the main page of
their website. Id.
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tions to sovereign immunity for agencies and instrumentalities,
but the standard under the UN Convention is friendlier to
claimants.157 Yukos could claim that, because Energomash is
ultimately one hundred percent owned by the Russian govern-
ment, it easily passes the Dole test of majority state owner-
ship.158 The ownership structure of Energomash, however, can
be distinguished from the “direct control” required by Dole; in-
deed, the tiers of holding agencies that control Energomash159
somewhat resemble those of the Dead Sea Companies in
Dole.160 The UN Convention has no requirement for direct or
indirect control, and it states that agencies or instrumentalities
will only be afforded immunity for their actions performed
while “acting in the capacity of the sovereign.”161 Nevertheless,
a US lower court will still be bound by the Supreme Court’s
holding in Dole.162
An alternate approach for Yukos would be to argue that, be-
cause Energomash’s majority shareholder, ORKK, is best char-
acterized as a “political subdivision” of the Russian govern-
ment, the government does, in fact, have direct control over
Energomash’s majority shares.163 This approach was applied by
157. The official commentary prepared by the ILC on its 1991 Draft Articles
on Jurisdictional Immunities states that “[s]tate enterprises or other entities
are presumed not to be entitled to perform governmental functions, and ac-
cordingly, as a rule, are not entitled to invoke immunity. . . .” U.N. Interna-
tional Law Commission, Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property, art. 2, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc A/46/10 (1991).
158. On this point, the FISA commentary reads: “If such entities are entire-
ly owned by a foreign state, they would of course be included in the defini-
tion.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 1406 (1976).
159. Energomash stock is fifty-two percent owned by ORKK, the successor
to the Roscosmos space agency, while forty-five percent is owned by State
Space Corporation Roscosmos, and the remaining three percent is owned by
the Russian Federation as State Space Corporation Roscosmos. NPO
ENERGOMASH, supra note 156.
160. Dole, 538 U.S. at 477.
161. UN Convention, supra note 9, art. 12.
162. The principle of stare decisis applies here, where lower courts must
follow the holdings of higher courts. See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
163. Although ORKK is the successor to the Roscosmos Federal Space
Agency, which was eliminated by presidential decree in 2015, it is now entire-
ly owned by the holding company, State Space Corporation Roscosmos.
ROSCOSMOS, https://www.roscosmos.ru/219/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). This
latter entity is headed by Dmitri Rogozin, the former Deputy Prime Minister
and head of Russia’s defense industry, and it is described as a “state corpora-
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the court in Filler v. Hanvit Bank as an alternative to the “tier-
ing” rejected in Dole, and it might be all the more appropriate
in the present case because Energomash is entirely owned by
the Russian government, so there is no issue of dilution of gov-
ernment control.164 The NOGA court, when confronted with the
status of the Russian government as a separate entity from the
state, considered international law standards to resolve that
novel question,165 and the issue presented by Yukos would be
similar. Following Bancec, the court would also need to consid-
er equitable factors when determining agent or instrumentality
status.166 These cut strongly in favor of Yukos, as allowing
states to reclassify agencies as corporations to avoid all liability
would undermine the purpose of sovereign immunity.167 In this
case, designating ORKK as separate from the government
would imply that Russia, which runs the world’s only human
spaceflight program, has no national space agency.168
The Sedelmayer cases suggest that courts are willing to at-
tribute agency status to state-owned entities like Energomash
when equity requires it, and that the property of such entities
engaged in commercial activities abroad will be subject to at-
tachment.169 Further, international jurisprudence suggests
tion which realizes the policies of the Russian government in the space sec-
tor.” Id.
164. The court in Filler v. Hanvit Bank seemed to express the concern best,
noting that majority government ownership of one company could create an
infinite number of tiers of “state” companies because the recursive definition
of “agency or instrumentality” in the FSIA would grant each company, in
turn, the status of a state, allowing for perpetually diminishing levels of ac-
tual state control. Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2004).
165. NOGA, 361 F.3d at 679.
166. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 631.
167. Id.
168. NASA currently purchases seats on Russian-made Soyuz rockets to
ferry American astronauts to the International Space Station. Jeff Foust,
Nasa Signs Agreement with Boeing for Soyuz Seats, SPACENEWS (Feb. 28,
2017), https://spacenews.com/nasa-signs-agreement-with-boeing-for-soyuz-
seats/. These seats are acquired by NASA through The Boeing Company
(“Boeing”), which in turn purchases them from the S.P. Korolev Rocket and
Space Public Corporation Energia (“Energia”), another ORKK-owned compa-
ny. Id. Plans are in place to purchase seats through 2020, when private
launch providers based in the US are expected to return American astronauts
to orbit. Id. Each seat currently costs US $74.7 million. Id. Attaching Boe-
ing’s payments to Energia would likely be impossible, as these funds come
directly from the US government. Id.
169. See generally Sedelmayer, Högsta Domstolen 2011-07-01 Ö 170-10.
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that Yukos can succeed in attaching Russia’s strategic assets
through the courts; it has already temporarily seized Roscos-
mos assets in France170 and threatened to do the same in Bel-
gium171 and the Netherlands172 before it was blocked by nation-
al legislation. Although NOGA was ultimately unable to seize
Russia’s uranium in Kentucky, it is worth noting that in that
instance, too, attachment was prevented by executive order,
not by the courts.173 At the present time, it is entirely possible
that a presidential order may block Yukos from attaching Rus-
sia’s RD-180 engines.174 However, this political ace in the hole’
may not always be available, and Yukos has the investor’s ad-
vantage of dictating the timing of its suit.175 Waiting for a new
presidential administration, for example, or the eventual de-
velopment of a replacement American rocket engine for the
RD-180, might be particularly advantageous to Yukos. In light
of the continually deteriorating relationship between Russia
and the West, Russia should perhaps be concerned that the
strongest protections offered to its space assets are the political
preferences of the US government.
CONCLUSION
If Yukos attempts to attach Russia’s rocket engines, US
courts are likely to find that such assets are not protected by
sovereign immunity. As property of a state instrumentality
held in a foreign country for commercial, non-governmental
purposes, the RD-180/181 seems to fit comfortably within the
170. Malet-Deraedt, supra note 72, at 332.
171. Russia Says Yukos Will Not Pursue Brussels Enforcement Of Awards,
supra note 75.
172. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, National Re-
port for the Netherlands, in INT’L HANDBOOK ON COM. ARB. (Paulsson &
Bosman eds., 2018).
173. Exec. Order No. 13159, 3 C.F.R. 1429 (2000).
174. Since 2014, the US military has been the most vocal advocate of retain-
ing the option to purchase Russian-made rocket engines for use in national
security launches. Cf. Mike Gruss, Losing Access to RD-180 Engine Would
Prove Costly, Pentagon Panel Warns, SPACENEWS (May 21, 2014),
https://spacenews.com/40645losing-access-to-rd-180-engine-would-prove-
costly-pentagon-panel-warns/. Any executive order would most likely come at
the behest of the Air Force if the Energomash’s RD-180s were seized by a US
court. Id.
175. See Kahale III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?, supra note 53 for
a discussion of the many advantages on the side of investors accrued from
choice of timing.
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exception to immunity provided by both the FSIA and the UN
Convention. To be sure, attachment of a foreign state’s assets
under the FSIA is exceedingly rare.176 However, Yukos has al-
ready demonstrated that it is a determined litigant against
Russia, and it presumably possesses the resources to continue
pursuing its PCA award indefinitely.177 The recent, high-profile
success of Crystallex, an Canadian mining company, in attach-
ing Venezuela’s shares of Citgo to satisfy an International Cen-
tre for Settlement of Investment Disputes award is another po-
tentially positive development for Yukos.178 Depending on the
outcome of the ongoing appeal at the Hague, Yukos may well
be the next investor to attach a foreign state’s commercial as-
sets under the sovereign immunity exception.
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